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NOTES
DOES BRADY APPLY TO SUPERVISED RELEASE
REVOCATION HEARINGS?
Alex Breindel*
Many federal offenders face a term of supervised release upon leaving
prison. The successor to the federal parole system, supervised release places
conditions upon individuals’ freedom. Violation of a condition may result in
revocation of release and reimprisonment. To revoke release, the
government must prove to a judge by a preponderance of the evidence that a
violation occurred. At this proceeding, known as a “revocation hearing,”
the individual may contest the alleged violation and present their own
evidence.
Under Brady v. Maryland and its progeny, due process requires the
government to disclose material exculpatory evidence to criminal
defendants. This Note examines the potential application of the Brady right
to disclosure in supervised release revocation hearings. Lacking clear
guidance, federal courts differ in their application of this right in revocation
hearings. This Note discusses this divergence within the federal system as
well as the corresponding arguments that courts put forth.
This Note then argues that the U.S. Supreme Court’s due process
framework supports application of Brady to supervised release revocations.
This Note also argues that Brady application is supported by the
intertwinement of the Brady right and the right to effective counsel, as well
as the Court’s provision of counsel to contested revocations. Finally, this
Note addresses arguments against applying Brady and contends they are
unavailing.
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INTRODUCTION
As of September 2021, 108,932 individuals were serving terms of
supervised release.1 The successor to the federal parole system,2 supervised
release places conditions upon individuals released from terms of
incarceration.3 Overseen by probation officers,4 these conditions range from
prohibitions on committing crimes to undergoing regular drug testing.5
Courts may also tailor further conditions related to an offender’s history.6
The program is designed to be rehabilitative, easing the transition back into
the community.7

1. Judicial Business 2021, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/
judicial-business-2021 [https://perma.cc/A3UX-V8GD] (last visited Sept. 2, 2022).
2. See United States v. Reyes, 283 F.3d 446, 458 (2d Cir. 2002) (describing supervised
release as “the reformed successor to federal parole”).
3. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (listing the conditions “courts shall order, as an explicit
condition of supervised release”).
4. See id. § 3603(2) (requiring probation officers to “keep informed . . . as to the conduct
and condition of a . . . person on supervised release”).
5. See id. § 3583(d); see also U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, FEDERAL OFFENDERS SENTENCED TO
SUPERVISED RELEASE 10 n.44 (2010), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/researchand-publications/research-publications/2010/20100722_Supervised_Release.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PB4G-HYV2] (listing mandatory conditions).
6. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d); see also U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 5, at 10.
Conditions may include, for example, maintaining employment and refraining from alcohol
abuse. Id.
7. See Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 708–09 (2000) (“The congressional policy
in providing for a term of supervised release after incarceration is to improve the odds of a
successful transition from the prison to liberty.”).
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If an individual violates a condition, their release may be revoked.8 As a
result, they may be imprisoned for up to five years,9 in addition to a possible
new term of supervision upon release.10 From April 2017 to March 2020,
over one-third of all supervised release cases ended in revocation rather than
completion of the sentence.11 As Judge Jack B. Weinstein has noted,
revocation cuts to the core of the program’s transitional purpose: “Every
time a connection is broken with the world outside of prison . . . it probably
becomes more difficult to reconnect.”12
Before a term of release may be revoked, a revocation hearing must be
held.13 Here, a judge acts as the fact finder to determine both whether a
violation occurred and whether revocation is the appropriate response.14 The
government is represented by a United States Attorney15 and must establish
guilt by a preponderance of the evidence.16 The individual is entitled to
several rights, including the right to counsel and to present evidence, along
with a limited right to cross-examination.17
8. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3); see also U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, FEDERAL PROBATION AND
SUPERVISED RELEASE VIOLATIONS 8 (2020), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/
research-and-publications/research-publications/2020/20200728_Violations.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q6WQ-CLFV] (“[I]f an offender violates a condition of supervision . . . [the
court] may revoke the offender’s term of supervision.”).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (“[A] defendant whose term is revoked under this paragraph
may not be required to serve on any such revocation more than 5 years in prison if the offense
that resulted in the term of supervised release is a class A felony, more than 3 years in prison
if such offense is a class B felony, more than 2 years in prison if such offense is a class C or
D felony, or more than one year in any other case . . . .”).
10. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h) (“When a term of supervised release is revoked and the defendant
is required to serve a term of imprisonment, the court may include a requirement that the
defendant be placed on a term of supervised release after imprisonment.”).
11. Table E-7A—Federal Probation System Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics (March
31, 2020), U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/e-7a/federal-judicial-caseloadstatistics/2020/03/31 [https://perma.cc/C4F4-FHKV] (last visited Sept. 2, 2022) (click on
“DOWNLOAD DATA TABLE”) (34.2 percent from April 1, 2019 to March 31, 2020); Table
E-7A—Federal Probation System Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics (March 31, 2019), U.S.
CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/e-7a/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics/2019/
03/31 [https://perma.cc/5P4Z-BEGL] (last visited Sept. 2, 2022) (click on “DOWNLOAD
DATA TABLE”) (35 percent from April 1, 2018 to March 31, 2019); Table E-7A—Federal
Probation System Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics (March 31, 2018), U.S. CTS.,
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/e-7a/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics/2018/03/31
[https://perma.cc/U87V-TCQX] (last visited Sept. 2, 2022) (click on “DOWNLOAD DATA
TABLE”) (35.6 percent from April 1, 2017 to March 31, 2018).
12. United States v. Trotter, 321 F. Supp. 3d 337, 340 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).
13. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(b)(2); see also U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 8.
14. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e); see also U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 8 (detailing “the
procedure courts follow to determine [both] whether an offender has violated . . . supervised
release” as well as “the appropriate sentence following a violation”).
15. See United States v. Pearson, No. 08-20215, 2012 WL 2501118, at *3 (E.D. Mich.
June 28, 2012) (“If an application is made for revocation of supervised release . . . the United
States Attorney is to prosecute the action and present evidence in support of the allegations of
a violation.” (citing United States v. Burnette, 980 F. Supp. 1429, 1434 (M.D. Ala. 1997))).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3); see also U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 5, at 36–37 (“At
the revocation hearing, the government—typically represented by an assistant United States
attorney—bears the burden of proving an alleged violation by a preponderance of evidence.”).
17. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(b)(2)(C)–(D); see also U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 5, at
36.
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While there are limits on the admission of hearsay,18 neither the Federal
Rules of Evidence19 nor the Sixth Amendment right to confront adversarial
witnesses apply.20
In a pair of 1970s parole-era decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed
the constitutional due process protections accorded to individuals facing
revocation of probation or parole.21 These decisions have been uniformly
applied to supervised release.22 One aspect of due process the Court did not
address, however, was the scope of its holding in Brady v. Maryland23 that
prosecutors must disclose material exculpatory evidence to criminal
defendants.24 In particular, the Court has not addressed whether Brady
applies to supervised release revocation, nor revocation hearings in general.25
Thus, it is unclear whether individuals facing revocation of supervised
release are entitled to disclosure of evidence supporting their innocence.26

18. See United States v. Stanfield, 360 F.3d 1346, 1360 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“[H]earsay
evidence may be admitted in probation revocation hearings if it bears sufficient indicia of
reliability.”); see also U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 8 (noting that evidence must bear
“sufficient indicia of reliability”).
19. FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(3); see also United States v. Williams, 847 F.3d 251, 253 (5th
Cir. 2017) (noting that “the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply” to a revocation hearing).
20. United States v. Williams, 443 F.3d 35, 45 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[T]he Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment does not apply to supervised-release revocation hearings.”
(citing United States v. Aspinall, 389 F.3d 332, 342–43 (2d Cir. 2004))); see also Jacob
Schuman, Supervised Release Is Not Parole, 53 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 587, 617 n.210 (2020)
(collecting cases).
21. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (addressing due process protections for
parole revocation); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (holding that probation
revocation is subject to the same due process as parole).
22. See Robert McClendon, Supervising Supervised Release: Where the Courts Went
Wrong on Revocation and How United States v. Haymond Finally Got It Right, 54 TULSA L.
REV. 175, 186 (2018); see, e.g., United States v. Hall, 419 F.3d 980, 985 n.4 (9th Cir. 2005)
(“Parole, probation, and supervised release revocation hearings are constitutionally
indistinguishable and are analyzed in the same manner.”).
23. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
24. See id. at 87 (holding that failure to produce evidence “favorable to an accused”
violates due process “where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment”).
25. See United States v. Nix, No. 2:08-cr-00283-6, 2017 WL 2960520, at *2 (D. Nev. July
11, 2017) (discussing disparate treatment of Brady’s application to revocation); United States
v. Rentas-Felix, 235 F. Supp. 3d 366, 371 (D.P.R. 2017) (noting that courts have “questioned”
whether Brady applies to revocation); see also Welcoming Brady to Probation Proceedings,
16 CRIM. PRAC. REP. 5 (2002) (“Most courts have not determined whether Brady is applicable
in the context of probation revocation hearings.”).
26. Compare Nix, 2017 WL 2960520, at *2 (“Defendant’s assertion that the principles of
[Brady] are applicable to revocation proceedings is fatally undermined by the case law.”), and
United States v. Jackson, No. 4:02-CR-00094-01-WRW, 2009 WL 1690300, at *1 (E.D. Ark.
June 16, 2009) (“Defendant has cited, and I can find, no authority to support his position that
Brady applies to revocation proceedings.”), with United States v. Murphy, No. 3:01-CR-115,
2011 WL 13308177, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 21, 2011) (“[O]f course, the Government must
comply with its usual obligations under the Brady . . . decision[] regarding this supervised
release violation proceeding.”), and United States v. Ferrara, No. 89-289, 2008 WL 2222033,
at *4 (D. Mass. May 23, 2008) (ordering the government provide individual accused of
violating supervised release “all material exculpatory evidence or information”).
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The question is more than academic. From October 2017 to 2020, over 70
percent of federal offenders were sentenced to supervised release.27 And as
the Supreme Court noted in the context of parole, revocation “inflicts a
‘grievous loss’” upon the individual and others.28 Thus, the stakes are high.
The question is also timely. In October 2020, Congress passed the Due
Process Protections Act (DPPA).29 This act amended the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure (FRCrP) to require judges to remind the government of
their Brady obligation and to issue model Brady orders.30 In addition to
highlighting the importance of Brady disclosure,31 the DPPA is designed to
foster uniformity in Brady’s application.32 As one district judge lamented
regarding uneven Brady practice, “[i]f the courts are to maintain their
integrity and high public regard, they should not Balkanize the impact of
constitutional obligations.”33 However, although the DPPA may help
achieve Brady uniformity in its traditional context, it is unlikely to address a
more overlooked source of Brady division: whether or not its protections
apply to individuals facing revocation of supervised release.
This Note seeks to resolve uncertainty about Brady’s potential application
to supervised release revocation hearings. Part I discusses the history and
structure of supervised release and its revocation, as well as the due process
protections that have been accorded to individuals facing revocations. Part
II discusses the history of the Brady right, its connection to the right to
counsel, and the Supreme Court’s treatment of Brady in the context of plea
27. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES: FISCAL YEAR 2020,
at 10 (2021) [hereinafter OVERVIEW 2020], https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/
research-and-publications/research-publications/2021/FY20_Overview_Federal_Criminal_
Cases.pdf [https://perma.cc/9EVS-YHFJ] (72.9 percent in federal fiscal year 2020); U.S.
SENT’G COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES: FISCAL YEAR 2019, at 10 (2020)
[hereinafter OVERVIEW 2019], https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-andpublications/research-publications/2020/FY19_Overview_Federal_Criminal_Cases.pdf
[https://perma.cc/96G8-GMPV] (74.8 percent in federal fiscal year 2019); U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES: FISCAL YEAR 2018, at 10 (2019)
[hereinafter OVERVIEW 2018], https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-andpublications/research-publications/2019/FY18_Overview_Federal_Criminal_Cases.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4YG3-TEQH] (74.7 percent in federal fiscal year 2018). The federal fiscal
year runs from October 1 to September 30 and is designated by the year in which it ends. See
OVERVIEW 2020, supra, at 1 n.2.
28. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (“[T]he liberty of a parolee,
although indeterminate, includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty and its
termination inflicts a ‘grievous loss’ on the parolee and often on others.”).
29. Pub. L. No. 116-182, 134 Stat. 894 (2020) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 18 U.S.C.); see also Press Release, Dan Sullivan, U.S. Sen., Sullivan-Durbin Due Process
Protections Act Signed into Law (Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.sullivan.senate.gov/newsroom/
press-releases/sullivan-durbin-due-process-protections-act-signed-into-law [https://perma.cc/
VQ74-WHH4].
30. Due Process Protections Act § 2.
31. See Press Release, Dan Sullivan, supra note 29 (“Having these ‘Brady orders’ in place
will make evidence disclosure requirements a priority for prosecutors . . . .”).
32. See Donald W. Molloy & John S. Siffert, The Due Process Protection Act: How Rule
5(f) Came to Be and Where Do We Go from Here?, CHAMPION, March 2021, at 55, 57 (noting
the DPPA amendment “explicitly, if not implicitly” requires courts “foster[] a single system
of rules for all criminal cases”).
33. Id.
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negotiations. Part III discusses the disparate treatment of the Brady right in
the context of revocation within the federal court system. Part IV argues that
due process and other considerations weigh in favor of applying Brady to
supervised release revocation hearings.
I. SUPERVISED RELEASE AND REVOCATION
This part discusses supervised release, revocation, and due process. Part
I.A discusses the creation of supervised release. Part I.B discusses the
procedures underlying the imposition of supervised release, its duration, and
its conditions. Part I.C discusses the mechanisms for revoking supervised
release. Part I.D discusses the due process protections the Supreme Court
has accorded to individuals facing revocations.
A. From Parole to Supervised Release
Supervised release was created as part of the Sentencing Reform Act of
198434 (SRA).35 The SRA abolished the federal parole system and put in
place supervised release as its “reformed successor.”36
Supervised release was intended to solve problems of “indeterminate
sentencing” that arose under the parole system.37 Under federal parole, an
incarcerated individual could be conditionally released after serving about
one-third of their sentence.38 The decision of whether to release the
individual fell under the “broad discretionary powers” of the United States
Board of Parole (the “Board”).39 Thus, sentences were indeterminate, with
actual time served subject to the decisions of the Board.40 The idea behind
this indeterminacy was rehabilitative: the possibility of release would
incentivize good behavior, while “experts” on the Board could determine
whether sufficient rehabilitation had occurred to allow for release from
prison.41

34. Pub L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).
35. See Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 696–97 (2000) (noting the Sentencing
Reform Act “eliminated most forms of parole in favor of supervised release”); Fiona Doherty,
Indeterminate Sentencing Returns: The Invention of Supervised Release, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV.
958, 959–60 (2013).
36. See United States v. Reyes, 283 F.3d 446, 458 (2d Cir. 2002) (describing supervised
release as the “reformed successor” to federal parole); see also Doherty, supra note 34, at 960
(“In place of parole, the SRA created supervised release, a new system of post-incarceration
supervision.”).
37. See Doherty, supra note 34, at 966; Schuman, supra note 20, at 602; Christine S.
Scott-Hayward, Shadow Sentencing: The Imposition of Federal Supervised Release, 18
BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 180, 188 (2013).
38. Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative
History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 226 (1993).
39. Doherty, supra note 34, at 991.
40. Id. at 987 (“[T]he judge imposed a sentence . . . [and] parole authorities determined
the actual duration of the imprisonment.”).
41. Stith & Koh, supra note 38, at 227.
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However, the indeterminacy at the heart of parole came under criticism in
the 1970s.42 In particular, scholars objected to the unchecked discretionary
powers wielded by the Board of Parole43 and the opacity of its
decision-making.44 They also questioned whether uncertainty in fact
incentivized prisoners or merely served as a psychological cudgel.45 The
U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, in a report on the SRA, described
uncertainty in sentencing as a “grave defect” lacking the “sureness” required
for a criminal justice system.46
The SRA resolved indeterminacy in sentencing by eliminating the
possibility of conditional release.47 Instead, individuals would be placed on
supervision following the completion of their prison sentence,48 to be
overseen by probation officers.49 Thus, rather than allowing for potential
shortening of a prison sentence, supervised release would be imposed at
sentencing and served only after completion of the duration of
imprisonment.50 Despite its departure from the methods of parole,
supervised release was meant to serve the same rehabilitative purpose by
easing an offender’s transition back into their community.51
Unlike parole, supervised release did not originally have a revocation
mechanism.52 As a result, supervised individuals could not be sent back to
prison for violating conditions of their release.53 This lack of a coercive
mechanism was intended to focus the program on rehabilitation and set it
apart from the incentives-based structure of parole.54 Instead, judges were
authorized to treat repeated violations as criminal contempt.55
Reimprisonment would thus require a full jury trial and conviction of
criminal contempt beyond a reasonable doubt.56
However, Congress added a revocation mechanism before the SRA went
into effect.57 A provision in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 198658 (ADAA)
42. See id. at 227–28; see also Doherty, supra note 34, at 991–95 (discussing various
contemporary criticisms of parole).
43. See Doherty, supra note 34, at 991; Stith & Koh, supra note 38, at 228.
44. See Doherty, supra note 34, at 991–92 (“Because of the closed system of individual
voting . . . . Prisoners and the public were left to guess at the reasons, creating a deep mistrust
of the system.”).
45. See id.
46. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 49 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3232.
47. See Doherty, supra note 34, at 996.
48. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, ch. 2, sec. 212(a)(2), § 3583(a), 98 Stat. 1837, 1999
(1984).
49. Id. § 3601, 98 Stat. at 2001.
50. See Doherty, supra note 34, at 997.
51. See Scott-Hayward, supra note 37, at 190.
52. Id. at 191; Doherty, supra note 34, at 999.
53. Schuman, supra note 20, at 604.
54. See Doherty, supra note 34, at 999 (“Supervised release would provide rehabilitative
services, but not in the guise of the coerced cure.”); Scott-Hayward, supra note 37, at 191.
55. Doherty, supra note 34, at 999–1000; Scott-Hayward, supra note 37, at 191.
56. Doherty, supra note 34, at 1000.
57. Id.; Scott-Hayward, supra note 37, at 191.
58. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).
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allowed for revocation upon finding by a preponderance of the evidence that
an individual violated a condition of release.59 Revocation proceedings to
determine violations would be governed by the same procedures as probation
revocations,60 which are codified in FRCrP Rule 32.1 (“Rule 32.1”).61 The
amendment came after lobbying from probation officials who worried
individuals would violate conditions with impunity in the absence of a threat
of incarceration.62
B. Imposition, Duration, and Conditions of Release
A court may impose a term of supervised release as part of an offender’s
sentence for a felony or misdemeanor.63 For some offenses, supervised
release is mandatory as provided by an underlying statute.64 Otherwise, the
decision is discretionary.65 In making their determination, courts are directed
to consider many of the same broad factors considered in sentencing,
including the nature of the offense and the need for deterrence.66 The Federal
Sentencing Guidelines (the “Guidelines”) recommend imposing supervised
release for any sentence greater than one year, unless the individual is likely
to be deported after imprisonment.67
In practice, supervised release is imposed in the majority of cases. In
federal fiscal year 2020, for example, 72.9 percent of all federal offenders
were sentenced to supervised release.68 This figure was 74.8 percent in
201969 and 74.7 percent in 2018.70 Excluding immigration cases for which
the Guidelines discourage supervised release,71 over 84 percent of offenders
were sentenced to supervised release in federal fiscal year 2018,72 2019,73
and 2020.74 The trend appears be driven at least in part by deference to the
Guidelines: a 2010 report by the U.S. Sentencing Commission found that

59. Id. tit. I, sec. 1006(3)(D), § 3583(4), 100 Stat. at 3207-7.
60. Id.
61. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1.
62. See Doherty, supra note 34, at 1001–02; see also Barbara Meierhoefer Vincent,
Supervised Release: Looking for a Place in a Determinate Sentencing System, 6 FED. SENT’G
REP. 187, 188 (1994).
63. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a).
64. Id.; see also OFF. OF GEN. COUNS., U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, PRIMER ON SUPERVISED
RELEASE 2 (2020), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/primers/2020_
Primer_Supervised_Release.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6M2-YAB6].
65. Id.
66. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c); see also OFF. OF GEN. COUNS., supra note 64, at 3.
67. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5D1.1(a)–(c) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
68. OVERVIEW 2020, supra note 27.
69. OVERVIEW 2019, supra note 27.
70. OVERVIEW 2018, supra note 27.
71. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
72. OVERVIEW 2018, supra note 27 (84.3 percent).
73. OVERVIEW 2019, supra note 27 (85.5 percent).
74. OVERVIEW 2020, supra note 27 (85.8 percent).
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sentencing courts imposed supervised release in 99.1 percent of cases in
which release was not mandatory but recommended by the Guidelines.75
Generally, terms of supervised release can range between one to five years,
depending on the offense.76 For some crimes, such as terrorist offenses and
offenses involving a minor, terms can run for life.77 In determining the
duration of supervision, courts are directed to consider the same factors used
to decide whether to impose a term.78 Duration may also be mandated by the
underlying statute.79
In 2020, the average term length imposed (excluding substantially longer
sentences for specified crimes) was forty-three months.80 Similarly, the
average term length imposed was forty-four months and forty-six months in
201981 and 2018,82 respectively. Median term length for all three years was
thirty-six months.83
Judge Weinstein suggested the imposition of lengthy supervised release
terms has become the norm. He reported that terms and conditions of release
are often “ignored” at sentencing, with all parties—including defense
counsel, the prosecution, and the court itself—“assum[ing]” supervised
release will be imposed for a “significant period” between three and five
years.84 Similarly, one scholar, Professor Christine Scott-Hayward, reported
that, among federal defenders in New York, supervised release is perceived
as mandatory such that “they do not even bother to fight its imposition, or
even the length of a term.”85
While on supervised release, individuals may be subject to both mandatory
and discretionary conditions.86
Mandatory conditions include not
committing another crime, paying restitution, and not unlawfully possessing
a controlled substance, among others.87 Additional mandatory conditions
may also apply to specified crimes.88 Courts may also create and impose
further conditions that are “reasonably related” to factors considered at

75. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 5, at 52; see also Scott-Hayward, supra note 37, at
193 (“[T]he Sentencing Guidelines largely govern the sentencing process, including the
imposition of supervised release.”).
76. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(b)(1)–(3).
77. See id. §§ 3583(j)–(k).
78. Id. § 3583(c).
79. OFF. OF GEN. COUNS., supra note 64, at 3.
80. OVERVIEW 2020, supra note 27.
81. OVERVIEW 2019, supra note 27.
82. OVERVIEW 2018, supra note 27.
83. OVERVIEW 2020, supra note 27; OVERVIEW 2019, supra note 27; OVERVIEW 2018,
supra note 27.
84. United States v. Trotter, 321 F. Supp. 3d 337, 340 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).
85. Scott-Hayward, supra note 37, at 209; see also Zachary J. Weiner, Note, Revoking
Supervised Release in the Age of Legal Cannabis, 94 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 231, 237 (2020)
(noting some judges view supervised release as a “de facto extension of prison sentences”).
86. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).
87. Id.
88. Id. For example, defendants convicted of domestic violence for the first time are to
attend court-approved rehabilitation if “readily available.” Id.
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sentencing and involve “no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably
necessary” for deterrence and treatment.89
The Guidelines provide a list of thirteen recommended “standard”
discretionary conditions, including “liv[ing] at a place approved by the
probation officer” and “allow[ing] the probation officer to visit the defendant
at any time at his or her home or elsewhere.”90 The Guidelines further
recommend certain “special” conditions tailored to specific types of offenses
or specific identities of offenders, such as individuals with dependents.91
Judge Richard A. Posner found that courts often “rely heavily” upon the
recommendations of probation officers in imposing conditions.92 Judge
Posner further suggested that courts do not often examine the rationales
behind these recommendations.93 One reason for this “judicial insouciance,”
Judge Posner explains, is the infrequency of adversarial challenge.94 That is,
defendants are unlikely to object to conditions which will only affect them in
the distant future, instead focusing on short-term matters such as their
surrender date and the prison in which they will be placed.95 Indeed,
Professor Scott-Hayward reports that in thirty-eight sentencing hearings she
observed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York over
a three-month period, no objections were raised to the number or type of
conditions imposed.96
C. The Mechanisms of Revocation
If a probation officer or the government believes a supervisee violated a
condition of their release, they may file a petition with the court to revoke
supervised release.97 The court may then issue a summons or arrest warrant
for the supervised individual.98
At their initial appearance following arrest or in response to a summons,
the individual is informed of the alleged violation, their right to counsel, and
their right to a preliminary hearing.99 Unless waived, the court then holds a
preliminary hearing at which the government must establish probable cause
that a violation occurred.100 If this burden is met, the court may detain the
individual or release them pending a revocation hearing.101 The burden is on
89. Id.
90. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5D1.3(c) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
91. Id. § 5D1.3(d).
92. United States v. Siegel, 753 F.3d 705, 710 (7th Cir. 2014).
93. See id. at 711 (“Often judges seem not to look behind the recommendations, as
suggested by the fact that in his sentencing statement the judge may recite the conditions of
supervised release that he is imposing without giving reasons for why he imposed those
particular conditions.”).
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See Scott-Hayward, supra note 37, at 205, 209.
97. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 5, at 35.
98. Id.
99. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(a).
100. See id. 32.1(b)(1).
101. Id. 32.1(a)(6).
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the individual to establish by clear and convincing evidence that they will
neither flee nor pose a danger to the community if released.102 The court
must then hold a revocation hearing “within a reasonable time.”103
At a revocation hearing, the court must first determine whether a violation
in fact occurred.104 The offender is entitled to certain rights, including a right
to counsel, to disclosure of the evidence against them, to present evidence,
and to question adverse witnesses unless the “interest of justice” does not
require those witnesses to appear.105 The court serves as fact finder and the
burden is on the government to establish a violation by a preponderance of
the evidence.106 The government is represented by a United States Attorney
who prosecutes the alleged violation and argues the defendant’s guilt.107 The
supervising probation officer may be called as a witness.108
The hearing is subject to fewer procedural requirements than trials.
Neither the Federal Rules of Evidence109 nor the Sixth Amendment’s right
to confront adverse witnesses applies.110 Additionally, the government may
introduce evidence uncovered during an unconstitutional search and seizure
that would otherwise be inadmissible at trial.111 However, hearsay
statements must bear “sufficient indicia of reliability” to be admitted.112
If the court finds that a violation occurred, it must then determine whether
revocation is appropriate.113 For some offenses, such as possession of a
firearm or possession of a controlled substance under certain circumstances,
revocation is mandatory.114 Otherwise, the court is directed to consider the
same broad factors that guided the decision to impose supervised release.115
Instead of revocation, the court may also continue or extend the term of
supervision, modify its conditions, or sentence the offender to home
detention.116 The Guidelines recommend revocation for all violations

102. Id.
103. Id. 32.1(b)(2).
104. See OFF. OF GEN. COUNS., supra note 64, at 12.
105. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(b)(2)(A)–(E).
106. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).
107. See supra note 15.
108. See United States v. Pearson, No. 08-20215, 2012 WL 2501118, at *3 (E.D. Mich.
June 28, 2012) (“The probation officer’s participation in the guilt-or-innocence phase of the
proceeding is limited to being a sworn witness, if he or she is called by either the United States
Attorney, the defendant, or the court.” (citing United States v. Burnette, 980 F. Supp. 1429,
1434 (M.D. Ala. 1997))).
109. See supra note 19.
110. See supra note 20.
111. See United States v. Hightower, 950 F.3d 33, 37 (2d Cir. 2020) (noting that “the
exclusionary rule does not apply in revocation proceedings”); see also United States v.
Charles, 531 F.3d 637, 640 (8th Cir. 2008) (“Whether evidence was obtained in violation of
the Fourth Amendment to revoke [the defendant’s] supervised release is immaterial as the
exclusionary rule generally does not apply in revocation of supervised release proceedings.”).
112. See supra note 18.
113. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e).
114. Id. § 3583(g).
115. Id. § 3583(e).
116. Id. §§ 3583(e)(1)–(4).
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consisting of criminal offenses punishable by greater than one year.117 For
offenses punishable by less than one year, or technical violations that are not
criminal offenses, the Guidelines recommend either revocation or extension
of the term of supervision and/or modifications to its conditions.118
In practice, revocation is common. According to federal court system data,
revocation, as opposed to completion of the sentence, accounted for over
one-third of all supervised release cases terminated between April 2017 and
March 2020.119 This data is consistent with a 2010 U.S. Sentencing
Commission report which found that revocation accounted for one-third of
all supervised release cases terminated between 2005 to 2008.120
If the court decides to revoke release, it must then determine the proper
sentence of imprisonment. In doing so, courts are directed to consider the
same factors that guided their determinations of imposition and
revocation.121 However, the duration of imprisonment may not exceed the
maximum statutory release term authorized by the underlying offense.122
Additionally, the duration is limited depending upon the severity of the
underlying offense, with the maximum set at five years for a class A
felony.123 In calculating sentences, individuals are not given credit for time
served under supervision.124 The court may also impose additional
supervision following release, so long as the total sentence—including
imprisonment—does not exceed the term of release authorized by the
underlying offense.125 The Guidelines set forth recommended sentences,
calculated using the type of violation and the individual’s criminal history.126
D. Revocation and Due Process
In two federal parole-era decisions, Morrissey v. Brewer127 and Gagnon v.
Scarpelli,128 the Supreme Court laid out the constitutional protections
accorded to parole and probation revocation.129 These decisions have been
uniformly applied by circuit courts to supervised release revocation.130
117. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7B1.3(a)(1) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
The cited section refers to Grade A, B, and C violations. For definitions of each, see id.
§ 7B1.1(a).
118. See id. § 7B1.3(a)(2).
119. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
120. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 5, at 68.
121. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e).
122. Id.
123. See id.
124. Id.
125. Id. § 3583(h).
126. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7B1.4(a) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
Sentences range from three to sixty-three months. Id.
127. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
128. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
129. See McClendon, supra note 22 (describing Morrissey and Gagnon as the “pair of
parole-era Supreme Court cases in which the Court held that defendants facing revocation
were not entitled to the full slate of constitutional protections normally due a defendant facing
criminal prosecution”).
130. See supra note 22.
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In Morrissey, the Court addressed the question of whether the Due Process
Clause131 requires a state to hold a hearing prior to revoking parole.132
Petitioners filed habeas corpus petitions alleging due process violations after
their parole was revoked solely on the recommendations of parole officers.133
The district court agreed with the state that no hearing was required.134
The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling after balancing the
parties’ competing interests.135 The appellate court reasoned that prison
officials should be given “wide discretion” in dealing with individuals in their
custody.136 It found that “non-legal, non-adversary considerations” were
often the basis for revocation decisions, lessening the need for procedural
restrictions.137 Further, holding adversary hearings akin to criminal
proceedings would destroy the parens patriae role of the parole board and
lead to decreased granting of parole due to administrative burden.138
The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that revocation is distinct
from criminal prosecution.139 Because the individual has already been
convicted, they enjoy “conditional,” not “absolute,” liberty.140 As a result,
he is not due “the full panoply of rights” that would be accorded to a criminal
defendant.141
However, the Court found revocation is nonetheless subject to some due
process requirements.142 While the parolee’s liberty is not absolute, their
scope of freedom includes “many of the core values” of unqualified liberty
such that revocation “inflicts a ‘grievous loss,’” the Court explained.143
Thus, their liberty is “valuable” enough to come with the protections of due
process.144 As a result, revocation of that liberty requires some form of
ordered process.145
The Court examined the various interests at stake to determine the nature
of this ordered process. First, it identified the state’s “overwhelming” interest
in reimprisoning an individual without the burden of a full trial if they have
in fact violated parole.146 Second, it identified the interests of both the
individual and society in ensuring revocation is based on an “appropriate
131. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law . . . .”).
132. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 472 (“We granted certiorari in this case to determine
whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a State afford an
individual some opportunity to be heard prior to revoking his parole.”).
133. See id. at 474.
134. See id. at 475.
135. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 443 F.2d 942 (8th Cir. 1971), rev’d, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
136. Id. at 948.
137. See id. at 949.
138. Id. at 949–50.
139. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480.
140. See id.
141. Id.
142. See id. at 482.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 483.
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determination” and not “erroneous information.”147 While the individual’s
stake is based on preserving their liberty, society has an interest in “restoring”
the individual to normal life.148 Finally, it identified a societal interest in
“fair treatment” to enhance parole’s rehabilitative goals.149 Balancing these
interests, the Court held that due process requires “an informal hearing”
designed to ensure that the finding of a violation is based on “verified facts”
and “informed by an accurate knowledge” of the parolee’s conduct.150
Finally, the Court delineated what such a hearing would procedurally
entail. Broadly, it found the parolee must be able “to show, if he can, that he
did not violate the conditions,” or, separately, that the violation does not
warrant revocation.151 Declining to write a full code of procedure, the Court
set out to decide “the minimum requirements of due process.”152 “They
include,” the Court stated:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the
parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and
to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront
and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer
specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a ‘neutral
and detached’ hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of
which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement
by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking
parole.153

Notably, the Court explicitly declined to decide the question of whether a
parolee is entitled to counsel.154
Despite these newfound protections, the Court once again emphasized that
revocation is not equivalent to prosecution.155 Rather, the revocation process
should remain “flexible enough” to consider material that is inadmissible in
criminal trials.156 The Court explained that the procedural requirements it
set out would not abridge this flexibility and imposed no “great burden.”157
Less than a year later, in Gagnon, the Supreme Court addressed the
question left open in Morrissey: whether due process also requires provision
of counsel at a revocation hearing.158 In Gagnon, the defendant filed a

147. See id. at 483–84.
148. See id. at 484 (“Society has a stake in whatever may be the chance of restoring him to
normal and useful life within the law. Society thus has an interest in not having parole revoked
because of erroneous information or because of an erroneous evaluation of the need to revoke
parole, given the breach of parole conditions.”).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 488.
152. See id. at 488–89.
153. Id. at 489.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 490.
158. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 779 (1973), superseded by statute, Criminal
Justice Act Revision of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-651, § 102(a)(1), 100 Stat. 3642, 3642 (codified
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habeas corpus petition alleging a due process violation after his probation
was revoked without a hearing.159 He further argued that he would be
entitled to counsel if a hearing were held.160 The district court agreed,
granting the writ and ordering the state to provide counsel at the hearing
should it decide to seek revocation.161
The court of appeals affirmed. On the issue of a required hearing, the court
relied on circuit precedent.162 As to the right to counsel, the court reasoned
that because revocation requires finding that a violation occurred, there is
“likely to be an issue of fact,” the “just determination” of which may be aided
by counsel.163 Given this role in fact-finding, the court held that the
provision of counsel is necessary to ensure the right to a hearing is
“meaningful.”164
The Supreme Court quickly dispatched with the question of a defendant’s
right to a hearing by applying Morrissey to revocation of probation.165 The
Court found parole and probation revocation to be “indistinguishable” for
due process purposes.166 Specifically, neither is part of criminal prosecution,
but both result in a loss of liberty.167 Thus, both require the due process
protections outlined in Morrissey.168
The Court then turned to the alleged right to counsel. It began by noting
that although probation officers typically serve a supervisory, rather than
punitive, role, this position is altered once they recommend revocation.169
While this “modification in attitude” does not turn the officer into a
prosecutor determined to convict, the Court found their role vis-à-vis the
probationer or parolee is “surely compromised.”170 Due process thus
requires an “accurate finding of fact” to resolve the difference in viewpoint
between the parole officer and the individual in their charge.171
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3006A) (providing counsel for indigent defendants accused of
violating parole).
159. See Scarpelli v. Gagnon, 317 F. Supp. 72, 74 (E.D. Wis. 1970), aff’d sub nom.
Gunsolus v. Gagnon, 454 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1971), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom.
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
160. See Scarpelli, 317 F. Supp. at 76 (“[T]he petitioner in this case further contends that
if he is entitled to a hearing prior to revocation of his probation, he is also entitled to the
assistance of counsel at that hearing.”).
161. Id. at 78–79.
162. See Gunsolus v. Gagnon, 454 F.2d 416, 418–20 (7th Cir. 1971), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part sub nom. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
163. Id. at 422.
164. See id. at 423.
165. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973).
166. Id. (“Petitioner does not contend that there is any difference relevant to the guarantee
of due process between the revocation of parole and the revocation of probation, nor do we
perceive one.”).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See id. at 785.
170. Id.
171. See id. at 782 (“When the officer’s view of the probationer’s or parolee’s conduct
differs in this fundamental way from the latter’s own view, due process requires that the
difference be resolved before revocation becomes final.”).
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While Morrissey serves this interest by providing “substantial protection
against ill-considered revocation,” it does not follow that counsel is never
required.172 Echoing the court of appeals, the Court found that the
“effectiveness” of the rights guaranteed by Morrissey may depend on the
presence of counsel.173 Specifically, a probationer or parolee may be unable
to present “his version of a disputed set of facts” pro se where doing so
requires examining or cross-examining witnesses or offering complex
evidence.174
However, the Court declined to establish a blanket rule requiring counsel
at all revocation hearings.175 The Court explained that such a rule would
impose costs without regard to the probability that counsel would actually
contribute to a particular proceeding.176 For example, “most” revocations
are based on convictions of crimes or admissions to violations, eliminating
the need for fact-finding.177 As to costs, the Court pointed to both the
“significant[]” alteration to the nature of the proceeding—becoming more
akin to a trial—as well as the financial costs of counsel, a longer record, and
judicial review.178
Instead, the Court held that counsel must be provided where a defendant’s
version of events “can fairly be represented only by a trained advocate.”179
Discretion for provision of counsel is left in the hands of the authority
overseeing the revocation, to be determined on a case-by-case basis.180
However, the Court identified two situations in which counsel should
“[p]resumptively” be provided: (1) where the individual contests the charged
violation or (2) where the individual seeks to offer complex reasons why
revocation is nonetheless inappropriate.181 In sum, the Court found that
counsel would be constitutionally unnecessary in most cases but would be
required by “fundamental fairness—the touchstone of due process”—in
others.182
The core procedural holding of Morrissey, made applicable to probation
by Gagnon, has been codified in Rule 32.1.183 The rule currently governs
172. See id. at 786.
173. See id.
174. Id. at 786–87 (“Despite the informal nature of the proceedings and the absence of
technical rules of procedure or evidence, the unskilled or uneducated probationer or parolee
may well have difficulty in presenting his version of a disputed set of facts where the
presentation requires the examining or cross-examining of witnesses or the offering or
dissecting of complex documentary evidence.”).
175. See id. at 787.
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. Id.; see id. at 788 (“Certainly, the decisionmaking process will be prolonged, and the
financial cost to the State—for appointed counsel, counsel for the State, a longer record, and
the possibility of judicial review—will not be insubstantial.”).
179. Id. at 788.
180. See id.
181. Id. at 790.
182. Id.
183. See United States v. LeBlanc, 175 F.3d 511, 515 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that Rule 32.1
is “largely a codification” of Morrissey).
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the procedure for revocation or modification of probation or supervised
release.184 The rule also provides for the right to counsel at all revocation
hearings.185
Subsequently, courts of appeals uniformly applied Morrissey and Gagnon
to revocation of supervised release.186 As one court explained: “Like parole
and probation, fewer constitutional safeguards are needed to protect the
conditional liberty interest during supervised release.”187
II. THE BRADY RIGHT
This part discusses the Brady right from multiple angles. Part II.A
discusses the creation and subsequent refinements of the Brady right. Part
II.B discusses the connection between the Brady right and the right to
effective counsel. Part II.C discusses the Supreme Court’s analysis of
Brady’s application to plea negotiations.
A. The Brady Right to Disclosure
In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court considered whether the Due
Process Clause requires prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence to
criminal defendants.188 The petitioner, John Brady, was convicted of murder
and was sentenced to death for his participation in a strangulation.189 Prior
to trial, Brady asked prosecutors for statements made by his companion to
support the contention that he himself had not performed the actual killing.190
In doing so, Brady hoped to avoid the death penalty.191 While prosecutors
disclosed several statements, they failed to provide the companion’s
confession to performing the strangulation.192 After learning of this
omission, Brady moved for a new trial or sentencing.193
The Court began by noting its previous decision in Mooney v. Holohan.194
There, the defendant challenged his conviction by alleging it was based on
perjured testimony and deliberately suppressed evidence.195 Disagreeing
with the government’s narrow constitutional reading, the Mooney Court held
that “deliberate[ly]” deceiving the court by use of testimony “known to be

184. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1.
185. Id. 32.1(b)(2)(D). The advisory committee for the rules notes that although Gagnon
does not require counsel in all circumstances, 18 U.S.C § 3006A(b) entitles defendants to
counsel whenever charged with violation of probation. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1 advisory
committee’s note to 1979 addition.
186. See supra note 22.
187. United States v. Gomez-Gonzalez, 277 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002).
188. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 84–85 (1963).
189. See Brady v. State, 174 A.2d 167, 168 (Md. 1961), aff’d, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
190. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 84.
191. See Brady, 174 A.2d at 169.
192. See id.
193. See id. The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted relief regarding sentencing, but not
a new trial. Id. at 172.
194. 294 U.S. 103 (1935); see Brady, 373 U.S. at 86.
195. Mooney, 294 U.S. at 110.
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perjured” violates due process.196 Such a procedure would be the mere
“pretense of a trial,” the Court explained, failing to embody fundamental
ideas of justice.197
Unlike in Mooney, however, Brady did not allege that the suppression was
intentional.198 Nonetheless, the Court found the principle in Mooney was not
based on punishment of prosecutorial misconduct but “avoidance of an unfair
trial.”199 Whether intentional or not, withheld exculpatory evidence creates
a “proceeding that does not comport with standards of justice.”200 Thus, the
Court extended Mooney and held that “suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where
the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”201 This requirement of disclosure
became known as the “Brady Rule.”202
The Court has since expanded the types of material that fall under Brady.
In Giglio v. United States,203 the Court addressed whether due process
requires disclosure of a nonprosecution promise made to a witness who
agreed to testify.204 The Court extended Brady’s disclosure requirement,
holding that insofar as a witness’s credibility is important to a case, a jury is
“entitled to know” about any agreement relevant to that credibility.205 Thus,
following Giglio, Brady requires disclosure of both exculpatory evidence
establishing factual innocence, as well as “impeachment evidence” shedding
light on the credibility of a witness.206 Both types of evidence are treated
identically for purposes of a Brady analysis.207
The Court has also expanded the types of situations in which Brady
applies. In United States v. Agurs,208 a defendant challenged her murder
conviction after prosecutors failed to provide evidence of the victim’s
criminal background, which would have supported her self-defense claim.209
However, although Brady imposed a duty to disclose “upon request,”210 the
defendant in Agurs had made no such request.211 Nonetheless, the Court held
196. Id. at 112.
197. See id.
198. Brady, 174 A.2d at 169 (noting Brady did not allege that the suppression “was the
result of guile”).
199. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
200. See id. at 88.
201. Id. at 87.
202. See, e.g., William Talbert, Comment, The Brady Rule: A Watchdog Without Teeth,
86 UMKC L. REV. 237, 240 (2017).
203. 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
204. Id. at 150–51.
205. See id. at 154–55.
206. See Michael Nasser Petegorsky, Note, Plea Bargaining in the Dark: The Duty to
Disclose Exculpatory Brady Evidence During Plea Bargaining, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3599,
3605 (2013).
207. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 (1995) (noting that the Court has “disavowed
any difference between exculpatory and impeachment evidence for Brady purposes”).
208. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
209. Id. at 98–99.
210. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
211. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 99.
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that material exculpatory evidence must be disclosed even in the absence of
a request.212 In doing so, the Court noted that Brady marked a shift in focus
from primarily prosecutorial misconduct to potential harm to the
defendant.213 Thus, where evidence is of “substantial value” to the
defendant, “elementary fairness” requires its disclosure.214
Further, the Court has refined its standard of “materiality” for Brady
claims. In United States v. Bagley,215 the Court considered when a failure to
disclose Brady material would require reversal of a conviction. The Court
found that the concern underlying Brady and its progeny was maintaining
“confidence” in the trial outcome, where suppressed evidence could “make
the difference between conviction and acquittal.”216 Thus, the Court held
that evidence is material “if there is a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.”217 Reasonable probability, the Court explained, is
“sufficient to undermine confidence” in the verdict.218
Finally, the Court has addressed the applicability of Brady post-conviction.
In District Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne,219 a
defendant convicted partially on the basis of DNA evidence sought access to
more precise DNA testing in hopes of clearing his name.220 Relying on
circuit precedent applying Brady to post-conviction proceedings, the court of
appeals held that the defendant’s claim of actual innocence entitled him to
such a test under Brady.221 Reversing, the Court held that Brady was the
“wrong framework” for the defendant’s claim.222 The Court reasoned that
an individual found guilty and imprisoned has been “constitutionally
deprived of his liberty”223 and does not have the “same liberty interests as a
free man.”224 As a result, his due process interests are “limited” and do not
parallel those found preconviction.225 Thus, due process does not require the
level of protection that Brady affords.226

212. See id. at 110 (“[T]here are situations in which evidence is obviously of such
substantial value to the defense that elementary fairness requires it to be disclosed even
without a specific request.”); see also Petegorsky, supra note 206, at 3606.
213. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104 n.10 (“Although in Mooney the Court had been primarily
concerned with the willful misbehavior of the prosecutor, in Brady the Court focused on the
harm to the defendant resulting from nondisclosure.”).
214. Id. at 110.
215. 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
216. Id. at 676–78.
217. Id. at 682.
218. Id.
219. 557 U.S. 52 (2009).
220. Id. at 56–60.
221. See Osborne v. Dist. Att’y’s Off. for the Third Jud. Dist., 521 F.3d 1118, 1127–28
(9th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 557 U.S. 52 (2009).
222. See Osborne, 557 U.S. at 69.
223. Id. (quoting Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 (1981)).
224. Id. at 68.
225. Id. at 69.
226. See id.
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B. Brady and the Right to Effective Counsel
The Sixth Amendment provides for a right to counsel “in all criminal
prosecutions.”227 In Strickland v. Washington,228 the Supreme Court held
that this implies a right to “effective” counsel.229 Commentators and courts
have noted a deep connection between the right to effective counsel and the
right to Brady disclosure. For example, commentators have described these
rights as “symbiotic”230 and sharing a “unity of purpose”231 as well as a
“doctrinal link.”232 Similarly, the Supreme Court has labeled both rights as
“hav[ing] the effect of ensuring against the risk of convicting an innocent
person.”233
Ultimately, both Brady and the right to counsel seek to ensure that verdicts
are reliable.234 In an adversarial system in which defendants face financial
and structural disadvantages, Brady and Strickland ensure that fact finders
are presented with an effective defense from which they can reach a reliable
conclusion.235 To do so, these rights work in tandem: Brady ensures defense
counsel has access to material exculpatory evidence, while Strickland
ensures that material exculpatory evidence is presented to the fact finder by
defense counsel.236 Thus, the Supreme Court analyzes the materiality of a
Brady violation by asking how the evidence would impact the jury if utilized
by effective counsel.237 Similarly, highly effective counsel can render a
Brady violation immaterial by uncovering suppressed evidence on their
own.238 At bottom, there is a single inquiry: whether the fact finder was

227. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
228. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
229. See id. at 686–87.
230. John H. Blume & Christopher Seeds, Reliability Matters: Reassociating Bagley
Materiality, Strickland Prejudice, and Cumulative Harmless Error Review, 95 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1153, 1154 (2005); see also Petegorsky, supra note 206, at 3647 (describing
Brady and the right to counsel as “two sides of the same coin”).
231. Blume & Seeds, supra note 230, at 1194; see also Brief for Nat’l Ass’n of Crim. Def.
Laws. as Amicus Curiae in Support of George Alvarez at 18, Alvarez v. City of Brownsville,
904 F.3d 382 (5th Cir. 2018) (No. 1:11-cv-78) (“The rights to effective assistance of counsel
and to exculpatory information serve complementary roles . . . .”).
232. Justin F. Marceau, Embracing a New Era of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel,
14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1161, 1183 n.109 (2012).
233. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 398–99 (1993) (listing rights, including the right
to counsel and to disclosure of Brady material, that help prevent the conviction of innocents).
234. See Blume & Seeds, supra note 230, at 1194.
235. See infra notes 241–41 and accompanying text.
236. See Blume & Seeds, supra note 230, at 1179 (noting that both the Brady and
Strickland inquiries “ask what competent counsel would have done” with the suppressed
evidence); see also Barbara Allen Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence Favorable to an Accused
and Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1163 n.111 (1982) (noting that
the Brady inquiry is “linked to an assumption that the evidence would have been presented
effectively”).
237. See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 441 (1995) (“In this case, disclosure of the
suppressed evidence to competent counsel would have made a different result reasonably
probable.”); see also Blume & Seeds, supra note 230, at 1179.
238. See Babcock, supra note 236; Blume & Seeds, supra note 230, at 1178 n.95.
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presented with material evidence favorable to the accused or the verdict was
rendered unreliable by its omission.239
Justice Thurgood Marshall recognized this interplay in his dissent in
Bagley. Arguing that the Court’s materiality standard was too high, Justice
Marshall reasoned that the Court’s “stringent” ineffective counsel standard
“makes an effective Brady right even more crucial.”240 While the greater
onus may be placed on the prosecutor or the defense counsel, the common
goal is to ensure that, in a “skewed” adversarial system,241 the defendant has
the factual support to mount “a reasonable defense.”242
Agurs is instructive. There, the defendant was found inside a motel room
struggling with a man over a knife.243 The man later died of his injuries.244
The defendant claimed self-defense but was convicted of murder.245
Notably, the victim had twice been convicted of violent crimes involving a
knife.246 Despite some awareness of this criminal history, defense counsel
declined to investigate based on an incorrect belief that the defendant would
need to prove knowledge of these prior convictions to introduce them on a
self-defense theory.247 Thus, the jury was provided no evidence of the
victim’s arrests or convictions in evaluating the defendant’s self-defense
claim.248
However, a month after trial, defense counsel learned of his legal error and
sought out the victim’s criminal record.249 The prosecutor provided access
to his files, which contained a paper disclosing the victim’s prior
convictions.250 Subsequently, the defendant moved for a new trial.251 She
argued both that counsel was ineffective for failing to bring the victim’s
record before the jury, and that prosecutors had violated Brady by failing to
disclose the convictions.252 Despite the analytical differences between these
claims, both concerned the same underlying issue: whether the jury should
have learned about the victim’s criminal history.253
239. See Blume & Seeds, supra note 230, at 1180–81; see also infra note 253 and
accompanying text.
240. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 695 n.3 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
241. See id.
242. See id. at 694 (“[A]n inexperienced, unskilled, or unaggressive attorney often is unable
to amass the factual support necessary to a reasonable defense. When favorable evidence is
in the hands of the prosecutor but not disclosed, the result may well be that the defendant is
deprived of a fair chance before the trier of fact, and the trier of fact is deprived of the
ingredients necessary to a fair decision.”).
243. United States v. Agurs, 510 F.2d 1249, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev’d, 427 U.S. 97
(1976).
244. Id.
245. See id. at 1250–51.
246. See id. at 1251.
247. See id.
248. Id.
249. See id.
250. See id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. See Babcock, supra note 236, at 1172 (“[T]he whole issue in Agurs was whether the
jury should have heard about [the victims’] character. It seems clear that they should have.”).
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Tellingly, neither the court of appeals nor the Supreme Court focused on
the respective roles of the parties to whom Brady and Strickland are
addressed—the prosecutor and defense counsel. Instead, the decisions
centered on the single piece of suppressed evidence underlying both claims
and its potential impact on the jury.254 As a judge in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit explained, when Brady and Strickland claims
are both brought concerning a piece of exculpatory evidence not presented to
the jury, the resulting inquiries are “identical,” requiring a single
determination as to whether the proceeding was rendered “unreliable.”255
Thus, one pair of commentators described the analytical separation of Brady
and Strickland claims as a “false distinction,” arguing for its collapse into a
single reliability determination.256
Given their singular focus on reliable verdicts, both rights also share an
identical standard of materiality.257 Both ask whether, but for the violation,
there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have
been different.258 Notably, the standards are not just identical, but were
developed in tandem.259 In Bagley, the Court explicitly adopted its
“Strickland formulation” of materiality for Brady claims.260 Meanwhile, in
Strickland, the Court described its materiality test as “find[ing] its roots” in
the Court’s Brady precedent.261 In doing so, the Court drew a parallel
between one cause of “omission of certain evidence,” attorney error, and
other possible causes, including Brady violations and the deportation of
witnesses.262 Thus, the rights are linked not only practically, but doctrinally
within the Court’s jurisprudence.

254. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976) (“[I]f the omitted evidence creates
a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist, constitutional error has been committed.”);
Agurs, 510 F.2d at 1253 (“The materiality of undisclosed evidence is a much more significant
factor than prosecutorial misconduct or defense negligence.”).
255. See Kyles v. Whitley, 5 F.3d 806, 831–32 (5th Cir. 1993) (King, J., dissenting), rev’d,
514 U.S. 419 (1995) (“[T]he inquiry for both claims is identical . . . . Under Strickland and
Bagley, this court must determine whether there is a ‘reasonable probability’ that, but for the
two constitutional errors working in conjunction, [the] jury, considering all of the relevant
evidence, would not have unanimously found either that there was sufficient evidence to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that [the defendant] was guilty or . . . should receive a death
sentence. The heart of the inquiry here is whether the constitutional infirmities rendered the
proceeding unreliable.” (citations and footnotes omitted)).
256. See Blume & Seeds, supra note 230, at 1194.
257. See Leslie Kuhn Thayer, Comment, The Exclusive Control Requirement: Striking
Another Blow to the Brady Doctrine, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 1027, 1048–49.
258. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985); Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
259. See Thayer, supra note 257, at 1049.
260. 473 U.S. at 682.
261. 466 U.S. at 694.
262. See id. (“An ineffective assistance claim asserts the absence of one of the crucial
assurances that the result of the proceeding is reliable . . . . Accordingly, the appropriate test
for prejudice finds its roots in the test for materiality of exculpatory information not disclosed
to the defense by the prosecution and in the test for materiality of testimony made unavailable
to the defense by Government deportation of a witness.” (citation omitted)).
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C. Brady and Plea Negotiations
In United States v. Ruiz,263 the Supreme Court addressed Brady’s
applicability to plea negotiations. In particular, the defendant challenged the
constitutionality of a plea agreement that would have required the provision
of exculpatory factual information but waived any right to impeachment
evidence.264 Thus, the Court analyzed whether due process requires
disclosure of impeachment evidence prior to a guilty plea.265 While plea
negotiations differ from revocations, the Court’s decision can provide a
blueprint for analyzing Brady’s potential application to new contexts.
To analyze the due process claim, the Court adopted its framework from
an earlier case, Ake v. Oklahoma.266 There, the Court described its due
process determination as guided by three factors:
The first is the private interest that will be affected by the action of the
State. The second is the governmental interest that will be affected if the
safeguard is to be provided. The third is the probable value of the additional
or substitute procedural safeguards that are sought, and the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of the affected interest if those safeguards are not
provided.267

The Court noted that these were the “very considerations” that led to its initial
adoption of Brady and Giglio disclosure rights.268
First, the Court found that the value of impeachment evidence to the
defendant was “limited.”269 While the Court did not identify the private
interest at stake, in Ake it described the interest in the accuracy of a
proceeding that risks an individual’s liberty as “almost uniquely
compelling.”270 Nonetheless, the Court found that impeachment evidence
was “special in relation to the fairness of a trial.”271 In particular, a defendant
at the plea stage would likely be unaware of the prosecution’s potential case,
and thus unable to gauge the value of impeaching any single witness.272
Given this “random way” in which impeachment evidence could be helpful,
the Court stated it could not describe such evidence as “critical” at the plea
stage.273

263. 536 U.S. 622 (2002).
264. See id. at 625–26.
265. Id. at 625.
266. 470 U.S. 68 (1985); see Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 631 (“This Court has said that due process
considerations include not only (1) the nature of the private interest at stake, but also (2) the
value of the additional safeguard, and (3) the adverse impact of the requirement upon the
Government’s interests.” (citing Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985)).
267. Ake, 470 U.S. at 77.
268. See Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 631.
269. Id.
270. Ake, 470 U.S. at 78.
271. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629.
272. See id. at 630 (“The degree of help that impeachment information can provide will
depend upon the defendant’s own independent knowledge of the prosecution’s potential
case—a matter that the Constitution does not require prosecutors to disclose.”).
273. Id.
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The Court did acknowledge the defendant’s concern that, in the absence
of impeachment evidence, innocent individuals would plead guilty.274
However, it found that provision of exculpatory factual information, as
provided in the agreement, along with other criminal procedure safeguards,
“diminishes the force” of this concern.275
Second, the Court found that requiring disclosure of impeachment
evidence would “seriously interfere” with the government’s interest in
securing “factually justified” guilty pleas.276 In particular, disclosure would
risk “premature[ly]” identifying government witnesses, disrupting ongoing
investigations, and exposing witnesses to potential harm.277 Further, it could
require devotion of “substantially more resources to trial preparation prior to
plea bargaining,” eliminating the efficiencies of the plea bargaining
process.278 As a result, it could lead the government to abandon its “heavy
reliance” on plea bargaining altogether.279
Balancing these considerations, the Court held that disclosure of
impeachment evidence is not required prior to the acceptance of a plea
agreement.280 Due process does not “demand[] so radical a change in the
criminal justice process in order to achieve so comparatively small a
constitutional benefit.”281
III. UNEVEN APPLICATION OF BRADY
This part discusses the disparate treatment that Brady claims have received
in the federal court system. Part III.A discusses courts that have held that
Brady does not apply to revocation. Part III.B discusses courts that have held
that Brady applies to revocation or that have directed the government to
comply with its requirements. Part III.C discusses courts that have faced
Brady claims in the context of revocation but declined to reach the question
of its application.
A. Excluding Brady
Several district courts, as well as at least one circuit court, have held that
Brady does not apply to revocation hearings. These courts generally provide
a few different arguments.
First, these courts have held that because revocation is not a criminal
prosecution, Brady does not apply. For example, in United States v. Ataya,282
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit explicitly stated, albeit in
a terse footnote of an unpublished opinion, that “Brady only applies to
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

See id. at 631.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 631–32.
Id. at 632.
Id.
Id. at 633.
Id. at 632.
145 F. App’x 331 (11th Cir. 2005).
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criminal prosecution and not to probation revocation hearings.”283 Similarly,
a district court in California stated that “a parole revocation hearing is not a
criminal prosecution, which is the type of proceeding to which the Brady rule
applies.”284 These decisions cite to Morrissey or Gagnon, where the
Supreme Court stated revocation is not equivalent to prosecution.285 While
neither case explicitly states that Brady is confined to prosecution, Brady
itself only concerned a challenge to a trial and sentencing, 286 and discussed
trial fairness.287 Further support for limiting Brady to prosecution—or at
least not to revocation—can also be found in the Court’s statement in
Osborne that Brady is the “wrong framework” for post-conviction relief.288
Second, courts have found that Rule 32.1, by codifying Morrissey,289
provides all the due process protections required for revocation. For
example, in United States v. Nix,290 a district court in Nevada stated that “so
long as Rule 32.1 is followed, a probationer will receive all the due process
he is entitled to.”291 Similarly, a district court in California held that Brady
was inapplicable in part because Rule 32.1 only requires disclosure of
evidence used against the defendant, not evidence that could be used on the
defendant’s behalf.292 This reading of Rule 32.1 as exhaustive of due process
rights at revocation finds support in the language of Morrissey itself, where
the Court described its task as putting forth “the minimum requirements of
due process.”293
Third, courts have held that Brady is inapplicable because it applies to
prosecutors, not the probation office. In United States v. Gonzalez,294 a
district court in Colorado found that “while Brady applies to prosecutors . . .
the Probation Office is not a prosecutor.”295 In particular, the court noted
that, unlike prosecutors, the probation office is a neutral “investigatory and
283. Id. at 333 n.2. Notably, the court did not supply a rationale beyond a citation to
Gagnon. See id.
284. Turner v. Larsen, No. C 11-6191, 2012 WL 12899114, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19,
2012); see also Gonzales v. Bartos, No. CV 06–2558, 2009 WL 825812, at *15 (D. Ariz. Mar.
30, 2009) (“[P]robation revocation proceedings are not criminal prosecutions, and thus are not
subject to the strictures of Brady.”).
285. See supra note 139, 167 and accompanying text.
286. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
287. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
288. See supra note 222.
289. See supra note 183.
290. No. 2:08-cr-00283-6, 2017 WL 2960520 (D. Nev. July 11, 2017).
291. Id. at *2.
292. See United States v. Berger, 976 F. Supp. 947, 950 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (citing United
States v. Donaghe, 924 F.2d 940, 944 (9th Cir. 1991)). While the court does not state this
finding explicitly, it describes as “law to the contrary” a circuit decision limiting Rule 32.1
disclosure to evidence used against a probationer. See id.
293. See supra note 152.
294. No.13-cr-424, 2016 WL 8458986 (D. Colo. May 28, 2016).
295. Id. at *3 (quoting United States v. Neal, 512 F.3d 427, 434 (7th Cir. 2008)); see also
United States v. Nix, No. 2:08-cr-00283-6, 2017 WL 2960520, at *2 (D. Nev. July 11, 2017)
(“Defendant’s reliance on Brady further fails because his motion concedes that the documents
he seeks are in the custody of the probation office . . . .” (citing United States v. Gonzalez,
No.13-cr-424, 2016 WL 8458986, at *3 (D. Colo. May 28, 2016))).
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supervisory arm of the court.”296 The court also relied on United States v.
Zavala297 for the holding that Brady disclosure “is not compelled . . . if the
[evidence is] in the hands of . . . the probation office.”298 Zavala in turn
relied on United States v. Trevino,299 which found the language of Brady
“directed entirely to the proper role of the prosecutor.”300 This position finds
support in both the facts of Brady and its central holding, which refers to
suppression “by the prosecution.”301
Finally, courts have relied on the apparent consensus that Brady does not
apply, or a lack of precedent for finding that it does. In United States v.
Garreau,302 a district court in South Dakota found that courts addressing the
issue “appear to agree that the Brady rule does not apply to adult
postconviction revocation proceedings,”303 citing Ataya, Nix, and Gonzalez,
among others.304 Similarly, a district court in Arkansas stated it could find
“no authority to support” Brady’s application,305 while a district court in
California found that the probationer himself “cited no authority” for
applying Brady.306 Lastly, in Nix, the court found that no circuit court has
held that Brady applies to revocation.307
296. See Gonzalez, 2016 WL 8458986, at *3 (quoting United States v. Davis, 151 F.3d
1304, 1306 (10th Cir. 1998)).
297. 839 F.2d 523 (9th Cir. 1988).
298. Gonzalez, 2016 WL 8458986, at *3 (quoting United States v. Zavala, 839 F.2d 523,
528 (9th Cir. 1988)).
299. 556 F.2d 1265 (5th Cir. 1977).
300. Id. at 1270 (“Brady involved evidence available to and suppressed by the prosecution;
its language is directed entirely to the proper role of the prosecutor in according the accused a
fair trial . . . .”). In particular, the defendants in Trevino sought access to a presentence report,
compiled by the probation office, of a governmental witness to impeach that witness. See id.
at 1270. The court “decline[d] to extend Brady’s reach by holding that a discovery motion
addressed in effect to a court or its probation officer, rather than the prosecution, asking
production of a witness’ presentence report, must be granted under Brady’s authority.” Id. at
1271.
301. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
302. 558 F. Supp. 3d 794 (D.S.D. 2021).
303. Id. at 798.
304. See id. at 798 n.18. However, not all the court’s citations support Brady’s
inapplicability. For example, the court cites United States v. Neal, 512 F.3d 427 (7th Cir.
2008), where the circuit court declined to “reach the substantive issue whether . . . an
individual subject to revocation proceedings is entitled to exculpatory material.” Id. at 438.
The court also cites United States v. Jones, No. 5:14-CR-74, 2017 WL 278478 (E.D. Ky. Jan.
20, 2017), objections overruled by No. 5:14-074, 2017 WL 460811 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 2, 2017),
where the court denied a discovery request for potentially exculpatory information. Id. at *1.
However, the court did not address Brady, but only Rule 32.1. Id. Additionally, in overruling
objections to the order, the district court found that even under Rule 32.1, “a defendant in a
supervised release revocation hearing does have a limited right to discovery . . . if the
defendant is able to demonstrate that the requested evidence will likely uncover mitigating
evidence material to the case.” United States v. Jones, No. 5:14-074, 2017 WL 460811, at *3
(E.D. Ky. Feb. 2, 2017) (emphasis added).
305. United States v. Jackson, No. 4:02-CR-00094-01, 2009 WL 1690300, at *1 (E.D. Ark.
June 16, 2009) (“Defendant has cited, and I can find, no authority to support his position that
Brady applies to revocation proceedings.”).
306. United States v. Berger, 976 F. Supp. 947, 950 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
307. See United States v. Nix, No. 2:08-cr-00283-6, 2017 WL 2960520, at *2 (D. Nev. July
11, 2017).
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B. Applying Brady
A few district courts have applied Brady to revocation, either explicitly or
by directing prosecutors to comply with its mandates.
In United States v. Dixon,308 a district court in West Virginia noted that
other courts “questioned” Brady’s applicability to revocation.309 Addressing
the argument that Rule 32.1 provides all necessary due process, the court
found that some courts “suggest” that due process requires more than
adherence to the rule.310 Specifically, the court pointed to language from two
opinions from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: one referring
to a violation of “neither [Rule 32.1] nor due process,”311 and the other to a
finding of “no violation of [Rule 32.1] or of due process.”312 The court
reasoned that this language may point to an analytical separation between the
requirements of the rule and those of due process.313
The Dixon court then addressed the language of Morrissey itself. On the
one hand, the court found that Brady’s inapplicability is supported by
Morrissey’s discussion of the “conditional,” rather than “absolute,” liberty
at stake in revocation.314 On the other hand, the court noted that Morrissey
recognized a societal interest in not basing revocation on “erroneous”
information.315 After noting that the question was “close[],” the court held
it would be inappropriate to “categorically refuse” the compulsion of
exculpatory evidence.316 In particular, the court pointed to language from
Morrissey concerning the need for “accurate knowledge” of the parolee’s
behavior, as well as the parolee’s right to “show” that he did not commit the
alleged violation.317 The court thus grounded its holding in the defendant’s
“valid interests” in presenting evidence on his own behalf.318
However, the court also recognized that exculpatory evidence would likely
be in the hands of a probation officer, rather than prosecutors.319 Further, the
court found it would be unreasonable to ask probation officers “unfamiliar”
with Brady and its progeny to discharge a Brady requirement.320 Instead, the
court instituted a procedure whereby probation officers would submit
potential Brady material to the court for final review and possible

308. 187 F. Supp. 2d 601 (S.D. W. Va. 2002).
309. Id. at 602 (citing United States v. Berger, 976 F. Supp. 947, 950 (N.D. Cal. 1997)).
310. Id. at 603.
311. Id. (quoting United States v. Donaghe, 924 F.2d 940, 944 (9th Cir. 1991)).
312. Id. (quoting United States v. Tham, 884 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 1989)).
313. See id.
314. See id. at 603 n.2 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)).
315. See id.
316. Id. at 604.
317. See id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484, 488 (1972)).
318. See id. at 605 (“This procedure takes into account a defendant’s valid interests in
bringing to the Court’s attention evidence in mitigation of sentence and in support of not
revoking supervised release or probation.”).
319. See id. at 604.
320. See id.
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disclosure.321 As a result, defendants would receive Brady material without
placing an “unreasonable burden” upon the probation office.322
Other courts simply directed the government to comply with Brady during
revocation. A district court in Massachusetts, issuing a summons for a
violation of supervised release, advised the government that it must follow
Rule 32.1 and “also provide . . . all material exculpatory evidence or
information” as per Brady.323 Similarly, a district court in North Carolina
stated that, in addition to Rule 32.1, the government must “of course . . .
comply with its usual obligations under the Brady & Giglio decisions
regarding this supervised release revocation proceeding.”324 Finally, a
district court in Puerto Rico ordered a probation officer to disclose any notes
taken during the defendant’s supervision that were related to the alleged
violation and “may exculpate the defendant’s conduct.”325
C. Equivocating on Brady
Several courts entertained Brady challenges to revocation but declined to
reach the question of whether Brady applies. Some did so explicitly, while
others simply rejected Brady claims for lack of materiality or prejudice.
In United States v. Quiroz,326 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit addressed a challenge to an order denying the defendant’s motion for
a continuance of his revocation hearing.327 The defendant argued that a
compelling reason for continuance existed because the government failed its
Brady duty to provide the defendant with several reports, and the defendant
required additional time to review these reports for exculpatory evidence.328
However, the court concluded that the defendant “fail[ed] to come even
close” to establishing that the requested evidence contained exculpatory
information.329 Thus, in the absence of a potential Brady violation, it
affirmed the denial of a continuance.330
In United States v. Neal,331 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit addressed a direct Brady challenge to a supervised release
revocation.332 The defendant argued that Quiroz supported application of
321. See id. 604–05.
322. See id.
323. United States v. Ferrara, No. 89-289, 2008 WL 2222033, at *3 (D. Mass. May 23,
2008).
324. United States v. Murphy, No. 3:01-CR-115, 2011 WL 13308177, at *2 (W.D.N.C.
Mar. 21, 2011).
325. United States v. Rivera Guio, Crim. No. 12-691, 2019 WL 11637272, at *3 (D.P.R.
Nov. 27, 2019). Notably, the court made clear that Rule 32.1 only requires disclosure of
evidence used against the defendant, but nonetheless held that Brady requires further
disclosure than is provided for under the rule. See id. at *1.
326. 374 F.3d 682 (8th Cir. 2004).
327. Id. at 684.
328. See id.
329. Id. In fact, the court found the reports contained “multiple” admissions by the
defendant to violating conditions of release. Id.
330. See id.
331. 512 F.3d 427 (7th Cir. 2008).
332. See id. at 436.
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Brady by entertaining a Brady challenge to revocation.333 However, the
court rejected this claim, finding that the Eighth Circuit did not decide the
“foundational question” of Brady’s applicability, but instead rejected the
motion “[w]ithout first making this determination.”334 In support, the court
noted that Quiroz did not “directly” involve a Brady claim, but rather a
motion for a continuance.335 Nonetheless, the court found that the
defendant’s claim failed for similar reasons of proof, as in Quiroz.336 Thus,
the court rejected the claim but noted that it too “need not reach” the question
of Brady’s applicability.337
The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Third and Fourth Circuits followed
suit. In United States v. Petlock,338 the Third Circuit addressed a Brady
challenge to a supervised release revocation.339 The court rejected the claim
after finding that the defendant “faile[d] to identify” any exculpatory material
or to explain how such material could have “advanced a colorable defense,”
as the violation was based on a guilty plea.340 Similarly, in United States v.
Mitchell,341 the Fourth Circuit rejected a Brady challenge to a supervised
release revocation after finding that the requested evidence “could have no
effect” on the revocation decision.342 In neither case did the court address
the issue of Brady’s applicability.
Lastly, in United States v. Rentas-Felix,343 a district court in Puerto Rico
faced a Brady challenge to a supervised release revocation.344 The court
noted that other courts have “questioned” whether Brady applies to
revocation proceedings because they are not criminal prosecutions.345
However, the court rejected the claim after finding that the defendant was not
prejudiced by the absence of the alleged material.346 Thus, the court did not
address the direct question of whether Brady in fact applies.347
IV. BRADY SHOULD APPLY TO SUPERVISED RELEASE REVOCATION
HEARINGS
This part seeks to resolve uncertainty surrounding Brady’s application to
supervised release revocation hearings. Part IV.A argues that due process
balancing, as outlined in Ruiz, supports Brady’s application to supervised
333. See id.
334. Id. at 437.
335. Id. at 436.
336. See id. at 437.
337. See id. at 438.
338. 843 F. App’x 441 (3d Cir. 2021).
339. See id. at 444.
340. Id. at 445.
341. 429 F. App’x 271 (4th Cir. 2011).
342. See id. at 276.
343. 235 F. Supp. 3d 366 (D.P.R. 2017).
344. See id. at 369–70.
345. Id. at 371 (collecting cases).
346. Id. at 372.
347. See id. at 371 (“Assuming Brady applies here, however, defendant’s challenge cannot
stand.” (emphasis added)).
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release revocations. Part IV.B argues that application of Brady is also
supported by the Supreme Court’s provision of counsel in contested
revocation hearings in Gagnon. Part IV.C argues that the reasons put forth
to support Brady’s inapplicability are unavailing.
A. Due Process Balancing Favors Application of Brady
In Ruiz, the Court laid out the due process analysis to employ when
evaluating Brady’s potential application to new contexts.348 The Court
explained that it looks to three factors: the private interest affected by the
state action, the value of the additional procedural safeguard sought, and the
governmental interest that would be adversely impacted by the additional
safeguard.349 In Ruiz, the Court found that the value of impeachment
evidence at the plea stage was too “comparatively small” to outweigh the
“radical” change its disclosure would require.350 In the context of supervised
release, however, these factors point favorably toward Brady application.
The first factor is the private interests at stake. These are twofold: the
interest of the supervisee and the interest of society at large.
The Court has described the interest of an individual facing revocation in
strong terms. In Morrissey, it described parole revocation as inflicting a
“grievous loss.”351 The Court acknowledged that supervised individuals do
not enjoy total liberty but conditional liberty dependent on observance of
restrictions.352 Nonetheless, the Court found this liberty contains “many of
the core values” of unqualified liberty, making it “valuable” under the U.S.
Constitution.353 Echoing these findings, the Court stated in Gagnon that
revocation is a “serious deprivation” of freedom.354 Thus, the individual has
an important interest in ensuring revocation is based on accurate findings of
fact.355
Society also has an interest in accuracy due to its stake in the offender’s
future. As the Court explained in Morrissey, a societal interest in
rehabilitation is harmed when revocation is unwarranted or based on
“erroneous information.”356
This accords with Judge Weinstein’s
observation that revocation severs community ties, making it more difficult
for the individual to reintegrate.357 The Court reiterated this point in Gagnon,
reasoning that the state has an interest in accurate fact-finding to ensure it is
not “unnecessarily interrupting” rehabilitation.358 Thus, both the individual
348. See supra note 266.
349. See supra notes 266–66 and accompanying text.
350. See supra note 281.
351. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
352. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
353. See supra notes 143–43 and accompanying text.
354. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781 (1973).
355. See id. at 785 (noting that the supervised individual has an interest in accurate
fact-finding to “insure that his liberty is not unjustifiably taken away”).
356. See supra notes 147–47 and accompanying text.
357. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
358. See Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 785.
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and society share a common interest in ensuring revocation hearings produce
accurate findings of fact.359
The second factor is the value of the additional safeguard. Here, a
comparison to Ruiz is useful.
In Ruiz, the Court found that impeachment evidence is not “critical” at the
plea stage given its limited value.360 In particular, a defendant cannot foresee
whether such evidence is helpful, given the defendant’s lack of knowledge
of the prosecution’s potential case.361 Thus, the additional safeguard would
produce evidence with little practical value for the defendant in their present
situation.
In contrast, Brady disclosure would produce evidence highly relevant for
a revocation hearing. In Morrissey, the Court held that individuals facing
revocation have due process rights to present evidence and to cross-examine
adverse witnesses, absent a finding of good cause.362 By providing evidence
that establishes factual innocence and impeaches adverse witnesses,363 Brady
disclosure serves these two rights exactly. Thus, the safeguard lacks the
weakness identified in Ruiz: the uncertain benefit of any evidence
disclosed.364 Rather than being speculative, the value of Brady information
at revocation would be concrete, employed by the defendant in exercise of
their due process rights to present their case.
The third factor is the adverse impact of the additional safeguard on the
governmental interest.
In Morrissey, the Court described an “overwhelming” governmental
interest in being able to revoke parole “without the burden of a new adversary
criminal trial.”365 Thus, it cautioned that the process should remain
“flexible.”366 While Brady disclosure would burden the government, its cost
can be procedurally blunted, would not apply in every case, and would not
run afoul of Morrissey’s prescription for flexibility.
The primary burden on the government would be familiarizing probation
officers with Brady to allow them to discharge their obligation.367 This is
not an immaterial cost.368 However, this burden can be procedurally blunted.
In particular, the district court in Dixon instituted a mechanism whereby
officers would submit potential Brady material to the court for final review
and disclosure.369 As a result, officers would not need to become Brady
experts but could rely on the experience of the court. By tapping into existing

359. See id. (noting that “[b]oth the probationer or parolee and the State have interests in
the accurate finding of fact”).
360. See supra note 273.
361. See supra note 272.
362. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
363. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
364. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
365. See supra note 146.
366. See supra note 156.
367. See supra notes 319–19 and accompanying text.
368. See supra note 320 and accompanying text.
369. See supra note 321.
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sources of knowledge, this procedure lessens the marginal burden on the
probation office.370
Additionally, Brady disclosure would not be required in every case. As
the Court noted in Gagnon, revocation may often occur without a factual
dispute, such as when it is based on a separate conviction or a confession to
the violation.371 For example, for the twelve-month period ending June
2021, 32.7 percent of revocations were based on convictions for new
offenses.372 For the prior twelve-month period, the figure was 29.9
percent.373 Thus, for a significant number of cases, Brady would impose no
additional cost, lessening the overall burden.
Finally, requiring Brady disclosure would not run afoul of Morrissey’s
prescription that revocation hearings remain “flexible.”374 In particular, the
Court sought to preserve a procedural distinction between a revocation
hearing and a criminal trial.375 Applying Brady would not erase this
distinction. For one, both the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Sixth
Amendment’s right to confront adverse witnesses would continue to not
apply.376 For another, the individual would still have no right to a jury,377
and the government would still bear a lessened “preponderance of the
evidence” standard.378 In these cases, there is no factual dispute at the
revocation stage that necessitates Brady disclosure. Thus, Brady application
would not render revocation rigid, but would instead leave intact major
procedural differences between revocation hearings and trials.
In sum, due process considerations warrant Brady application to
supervised release revocation hearings. First, both the individual and society
share a common interest in accurate fact-finding at revocation. Second,
Brady would provide relevant evidence that the individual could employ, in
exercise of their due process rights to present evidence and cross-examine
witnesses. Finally, the burden of Brady disclosure could be procedurally
blunted, would not apply in every case, and would leave intact the core
distinctions between revocation hearings and trials. As opposed to the
“radical” change for a “comparatively small” benefit that was rejected in
Ruiz,379 Brady disclosure at revocation could amount to a comparatively
small change for a potentially radical benefit.
370. See supra note 322 and accompanying text.
371. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
372. See Table E-7A—Federal Probation System Federal Statistical Tables for the Federal
Judiciary (June 30, 2021), U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/e7a/statistical-tables-federal-judiciary/2021/06/30 [https://perma.cc/2A3Z-ZPPD] (last visited
Sept. 2, 2022) (click on “DOWNLOAD DATA TABLE”).
373. See Table E-7A—Federal Probation System Federal Statistical Tables for the Federal
Judiciary (June 30, 2020), U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/e-7a/
statistical-tables-federal-judiciary/2020/06/30 [https://perma.cc/6WEA-H7R8] (last visited
Sept. 2, 2022) (click on “DOWNLOAD DATA TABLE”).
374. See supra note 156.
375. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
376. See supra notes 19–20.
377. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
378. See supra note 16.
379. See supra note 281.
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B. Gagnon’s Application of the Right to Counsel to Revocation Supports
Application of Brady to Revocation
Gagnon’s expansion of the right to counsel at contested revocations
provides similar support for the adoption of Brady at those hearings.380 As
noted, Brady and the right to counsel share a “unity of purpose” in ensuring
the reliability of a verdict.381 In particular, these rights work in tandem to
ensure that relevant evidence is presented on behalf of the defense.382 Thus,
both ask the same question: whether the result of the proceeding would have
been different had the omitted evidence been introduced.383 Their
divergence in focus simply points to the two possible causes for the omission
of evidence in an adversarial situation: the government and defense
counsel.384
In Gagnon, the Court made clear a concern with the production of relevant
evidence and the reliability of the verdict at the revocation stage. As the
Court stated, provision of counsel would be necessary to present “a disputed
set of facts” and handle the “cross-examining of witnesses.”385 Further,
effective representation would promote accurate fact-finding, as outlined in
Gagnon and Morrissey.386 Thus, provision of counsel at revocation plays the
same role as at trial: ensuring evidence is presented and proceedings are
thereby accurate.
In this light, it would be anomalous to provide for counsel, but not Brady
disclosure, at a contested revocation hearing. First, both rights serve the same
purpose in securing reliable verdicts.387 If this purpose was considered
weighty enough in Gagnon to support the costly burden of providing
counsel,388 it would seem weighty enough to support the less burdensome
requirement of further disclosure.389 Second, because of the symbiotic
relationship between these rights,390 failure to apply Brady may undermine
their shared purpose. Specifically, if material evidence is not brought to the
judge’s attention, this would threaten the accuracy of the revocation
finding.391 However, in the absence of Brady, a defendant would only have
recourse to challenge this finding if the omission was due to counsel’s error.

380. See supra note 181.
381. See supra notes 231–38 and accompanying text.
382. See supra notes 234–41 and accompanying text.
383. See supra notes 255–57 and accompanying text.
384. See supra note 262 and accompanying text; see also Blume & Seeds, supra note 230,
at 1154 (“[T]he Brady and Strickland doctrines . . . govern the core functions of the main
players in the adversarial system.”).
385. See supra note 174.
386. See supra notes 171–73 and accompanying text.
387. See supra notes 234–38 and accompanying text.
388. See supra note 178.
389. Cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 490 (1972) (describing the requirements of an
informal hearing, including disclosure of the evidence against the defendant, as “not
impos[ing] a great burden”).
390. See supra note 230.
391. See, e.g., Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 484 (noting that revocation must be based on
“verified facts”).
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If instead the material evidence was buried in a probation officer’s file, the
defendant would have no grounds for appeal.392 Thus, an unreliable finding
would stand, despite the Court’s clear concern for accuracy in both
Morrissey393 and Gagnon.394
C. Arguments Against Brady Application Are Unavailing
Several federal courts have declined to apply Brady to revocation. As
noted, these courts generally point to a few arguments: (1) Brady only
applies to criminal prosecutions; (2) Rule 32.1 provides all the due process
required at revocation; (3) Brady only applies to prosecutors, not probation
officers; and (4) a lack of precedent applying Brady to revocation.395 As this
section will show, these arguments are unavailing.
First, courts have held that because revocation is not a criminal
prosecution, Brady does not apply.396 However, while the facts of Brady
only concern prosecution,397 the Court did not so limit its decision. Rather,
in its core holding, the Court referred more broadly to determinations of
“guilt . . . or punishment.”398 Additionally, the Court’s standard for Brady
materiality looks to the effect of suppressed evidence on a “proceeding,” not
a prosecution.399 Thus, the Court’s language does not support this narrow
reading of Brady’s application.
In Brady, the Court does refer to maintaining the integrity of trials as a
motivation for its rationale.400 However, this should not be read to limit its
holding. First, Brady itself concerned not only a trial, but also a
sentencing.401 Second, the Court’s discussion of fair trials was an explication
of a previous case, Mooney,402 which did challenge only a trial.403 Finally,
the Court emphasized the importance of fair trials in contrast to a singular
focus on prosecutorial misconduct.404 It did this to explain its holding that
due process would be violated by suppressed evidence regardless of the
prosecutor’s good faith.405 Thus, the Court’s discussion of fair trials was
meant to provide context for its decision, not to cabin its holding.

392. See, e.g., United States v. Donaghe, 924 F.2d 940, 944 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that
under Rule 32.1, probation officers are not required to disclose evidence to defendants unless
it will be used against them).
393. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
394. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
395. See supra Part III.A.
396. See supra notes 282–87 and accompanying text.
397. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
398. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
399. See supra note 217 and accompanying text. The Court continues to speak of a
“proceeding” when determining Brady materiality. See, e.g., Turner v. United States, 137
S. Ct. 1885, 1893 (2017).
400. See supra note 199.
401. See supra note 193.
402. See supra notes 198–99 and accompanying text.
403. See supra note 195.
404. See supra notes 199–99 and accompanying text.
405. See supra notes 198–201 and accompanying text.
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Notably, the government’s brief in Ruiz put forth the argument that Brady
is solely a trial right.406 Although the Court found for the government, it
declined to take this path. In fact, only Justice Thomas agreed, writing in
concurrence that Brady is supported by the principle of avoiding unfair
trials.407 The majority only went so far as to describe Brady as
“trial-related.”408 Thus, the Court has declined an open invitation to
explicitly limit Brady to trials.
In Osborne, the Court did state that Brady is the “wrong framework” for
post-conviction relief.409 However, this should not be read to exclude
revocation. First, the defendant in Osborne was seeking Brady material to
challenge a verdict.410 Thus, the Court looked to the due process accorded
to individuals seeking “relief from convictions.”411 In contrast, Brady
material at revocation would be used to challenge an alleged violation, rather
than to seek relief from a past finding. Second, the Court noted that the
defendant in Osborne had limited “liberty interests” due to his
imprisonment.412 In contrast, an individual facing revocation possesses
many of the “core values” of unqualified liberty, as explained in
Morrissey.413 These differences in both the potential use of Brady material,
as well as the status of the individual seeking the material, urge against an
expansive reading of Osborne to cover revocation.
Second, courts have held that Rule 32.1, by codifying Morrisey, provides
all the due process required for revocation.414 However, there is
disagreement among courts as to whether the procedural protections
provided by Rule 32.1 and constitutional due process are in fact
indistinguishable at the revocation stage. At the district level, at least four
courts directed the government to comply with both Rule 32.1 and Brady.415
Further, the Dixon court pointed to language from the Ninth Circuit that it
understood to “suggest” a divergence between the requirements of Rule 32.1
and constitutional due process.416 Meanwhile, circuit courts do not appear
to have squarely addressed the issue. Thus, the question of whether Rule
32.1 provides the requisite due process for revocation is unsettled. This
uncertainty weighs against relying on Rule 32.1 to foreclose Brady
application on its face.
406. See Brief for the United States at 12, United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002)
(No. 01-595) (“The purpose of the Court’s Brady decisions is therefore to protect the fairness
of the trial and to guard against the risk that an innocent person might be found guilty because
the government withheld evidence. That purpose is not implicated when a defendant enters a
plea in open court . . . .”).
407. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 633–34 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring).
408. See id. at 631.
409. See supra note 222.
410. See supra note 220.
411. See Dist. Att’y’s Off. for the Third Jud. Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 69 (2009)
(quoting Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 559 (1987)).
412. See supra note 224.
413. See supra note 28.
414. See supra notes 289–92 and accompanying text.
415. See supra Part III.B.
416. See supra notes 311–11.
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To be sure, the Morrissey Court described its task as providing the
“minimum requirements” of due process.417 However, the Court also said
those requirements “include” the procedures it set forth.418 Thus, the Court
did not clearly map the procedures it outlined onto the requirements of due
process. Instead, due process would have to at least “include” those
procedures. Notably, the Court explicitly reserved judgment on whether due
process would also require provision of counsel.419 This provides further
evidence that the procedures it set forth were not meant to be exhaustive of
the due process right. In any case, this lack of a clear equivalence further
urges against using Rule 32.1 to foreclose Brady application absent the
substantive due process analysis outlined in Ruiz.
Third, courts have held that probation officers are not subject to Brady due
to their neutral “supervisory” role, in contrast to prosecutors.420 However,
this ignores the Court’s statement in Gagnon that an officer undergoes a
“modification in attitude” once they have recommended revocation.421
While officers are not thereby transformed into prosecutors, their stance of
neutrality toward the supervisee is “compromised.”422 As a result, a focus
on the officer’s “benevolent attitude” is misplaced at the revocation stage.423
Thus, reliance on an officer’s neutral stance to foreclose Brady application
ignores this alteration in status.
Additionally, prosecutors have taken on a much greater role in revocation.
At the time of Gagnon, the Court noted that the state was represented by a
parole officer rather than a prosecutor.424 In contrast, at a supervised release
revocation hearing, a prosecutor represents the government and argues the
defendant’s guilt.425 At the fact-finding stage at which Brady is relevant, the
probation officer only participates if called as a witness.426 Thus, even if
Brady is directed at the role of prosecutors, it is nonetheless implicated at a
supervised release revocation hearing.
Finally, courts have pointed to an apparent consensus that Brady is
inapplicable, or alternatively, to a lack of precedent holding that it applies.427
However, this ignores at least four district courts that directed the
government to comply with Brady disclosure in revocation hearings.428
Additionally, although no circuit court has expressly applied Brady to
revocation,429 the Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits have entertained Brady
417. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
418. See supra note 153.
419. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
420. See supra notes 294–301 and accompanying text.
421. See supra notes 169–69 and accompanying text.
422. See supra note 170.
423. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 785 (1973).
424. Id. at 789 (“In a revocation hearing . . . the State is represented, not by a prosecutor,
but by a parole officer . . . .”).
425. See supra note 15.
426. See supra note 108.
427. See supra notes 302–06 and accompanying text.
428. See supra Part III.B.
429. See supra note 307.
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claims in the revocation context.430 Conversely, only the Eleventh Circuit
has held Brady inapplicable, albeit in a terse footnote of an unpublished
opinion.431 Meanwhile, the Seventh Circuit is the only circuit to address the
issue at length, but did so in dicta before declining to decide the merits.432 In
sum, the landscape is fluid, belying any notion that consensus exists.
CONCLUSION
Access to the constitutional protections of Brady should not differ
depending on the federal district in which a supervised release revocation
hearing is held. Thus, after highlighting the disparate treatment that Brady
claims have received among federal courts, this Note argued for Brady’s
uniform application. By addressing the reasons put forth against Brady’s
application, this Note also showed that existing arguments do not support
Brady’s exclusion. Rather, addressing Brady’s application requires a due
process analysis that balances the interests at stake. This balance favors
Brady’s application to supervised release revocation. Further, this finding is
logically supported by the Supreme Court’s provision of counsel to contested
revocations.

430. See supra Part III.C.
431. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
432. See supra notes 331–36 and accompanying text.

